Why aren't they locked in waiting games? Unlocking rules and the ecology of concepts in the semiconductor industry. by Le Masson, Pascal et al.
Why aren’t they locked in waiting games? Unlocking
rules and the ecology of concepts in the semiconductor
industry.
Pascal Le Masson, Benoit Weil, Armand Hatchuel, Patrick Cogez
To cite this version:
Pascal Le Masson, Benoit Weil, Armand Hatchuel, Patrick Cogez. Why aren’t they locked in
waiting games? Unlocking rules and the ecology of concepts in the semiconductor industry..
Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles,
2012, 24 (6), pp.617-630. <hal-00870358>
HAL Id: hal-00870358
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00870358
Submitted on 7 Oct 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Why aren’t they locked in waiting games? Unlocking rules and the 
ecology of concepts in the semiconductor industry.  
 
 
Pascal Le Masson*(1), Benoit Weil (1), Armand Hatchuel (1), Patrick 
Cogez (2) 
 
(1) MINES ParisTech, CGS- Center for Management Science, 60 Bvd Saint Michel, 
75272 Paris Cedex 06, France.  
(2) STMicroelectronics, Crolles, France.  
 
Mail: lemasson@ensmp.fr bweil@ensmp.fr armand.hatchuel@ensmp.fr 
patrick.cogez@st.com  
 
* Corresponding author. 
Postal address: MINES ParisTech, 60 boulevard Saint-Michel, F-75272 Paris Cedex 
06, France 
e-mail: lemasson@ensmp.fr  
phone: +33 1 4051 9221; mobile: +33 6 0970 1527; fax: +33 1 4051 9065 
 
 
Aknowledgements:  
This work was carried out with the financial support of the ANR- Agence Nationale de la 
Recherche (French National Research Agency) under the Programme RITE and the support 
of the Chair of Design Theory and Methods for Innovation of MINES ParisTech.  	  
 
 
Why aren’t they locked in waiting games? Unlocking rules and the 
ecology of concepts in the semiconductor industry.  
 
 
In a multi-level perspective, regimes can be clearly described as long as they 
remain stable. To understand how regimes and niches interact during transition, 
the article contrasts two models of regimes in transition(s). The classical model 
of evolutionary niches suggests misalignments between rules and competition 
between niches. Transition management, technological innovation systems and 
works on transition pathways suggest a second model based on “unlocking 
rules”, which support collective work on a structured set of emerging 
technologies. The latter model is illustrated with a case study on the 
International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS).  
 
 
Keywords: socio-technical regime, transition, strategic niche management, 
unlocking rules 
Introduction  
 
This paper deals with transitions in socio-technical regimes and the nature of 
regimes when they are in transition. In a multi-level perspective (Geels 2004; Kemp et 
al. 1998; Nill and Kemp 2009), transitions from one socio-technical regime to another 
can be explained by the interplay of stabilizing mechanisms at the regime level and 
(regime-) destabilizing pressure of new societal needs (at the landscape level), 
combined with the emergence of radical innovation at the niche level. This multi-level 
framework accounts for some historical transitions (eg (Geels 2002; 2005)) and for a 
specific form of policy for socio-technical regime transitions: strategic niche 
management (SNM). SNM advocates the creation of socio-technical experiments in 
niches to facilitate the incubation process of the new technology while being protected 
from the constraints of the dominant regime. However, some authors have underlined 
that SNM as a change strategy can have a limited impact (Caniëls and Romijn 2008; 
Nill and Kemp 2009). A “good” niche has to meet such demanding conditions (good 
choice of technology, experiment, market diffusion strategy, etc.) that in many cases, 
the niches are not capable of changing the socio-technical regime (Caniëls and 
Romijn 2008; Smith et al. 2005).  
Along similar lines, it has been suggested (Markard and Truffer 2008) that 
although it is indeed important to understand what happens at the niche level, it is also 
critical to understand what happens beyond that level, at the meso-level. At this level 
niches compete (Geels 2002) but also combine or aggregate (Geels 2005) and 
complementary effects of developments in different niches appear (Nill and Kemp 
2009). Few studies have been done at this level (Genus and Coles 2008) creating a 
major gap in the literature. To address this gap, we investigate the management of a 
set of niches, at the meso-level of the regime, whilst the regime is in transition. But, 
first of all, how can we characterize regimes in transition?  
In the model of transition in socio-technical regimes (Geels 2004), the regime 
in transition is described as a stable combination of rules, actors and technical systems 
that competes with niches where the regime rules are loosened (Geels 2002). 
However, this model leaves several open questions regarding the relationship, during 
the transition, between the regime level and the niches. Is the incumbent regime 
simply competing with the niches or is it able to interact and hybridize with them to 
mutate into a new regime? Are there alternatives to the evolutionary model?  
To study these alternative models, in the first section we use the 
complementary perspectives of transition management and technological systems of 
innovation, which have studied situations where transition is managed at the regime 
level. In this situation, the logic of management has generated specific rules for the 
transition (Kemp et al. 2007). Contrary to the evolutionary model where rules are 
loosened, weakened and then substituted by a new and more robust set of rules, in 
transition management and with technological systems of innovations, there are rules 
to support the transition. Our research question is: what are these rules, which do not 
lock new paths but create them? In cases where there are such rules, who are the 
actors and what kind of technical system can be associated with them?  
In the second section, we show that the literature helps to characterize an 
alternative model for regimes in transition that relies on rules at the regime level, 
which we call “unlocking rules”. We illustrate this with a case study of how the 
International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors supports regular transitions in 
the semiconductor regime (third section). This illustration helps us analyse other 
facets of a regime with unlocking rules at the regime level: i) at this level, actors and 
rules deal with the ecology of concepts of technical systems that can be imagined by 
the actors at a certain point in time (and not only with the existing system); ii) the 
actors coordinate and work together on these concepts in a specific collaborative 
setting, which we call a “college of the unknown” (fourth section). 
 
Models of regime in transition 
Transition management and technological systems of innovation provide 
insights into alternative features of the evolutionary approach to technical change.  
The logic of unlocking rules 
(Carlsson and Stankiewicz 1995) conceptualized a “technological system of 
innovation as an entity that creates novelties and supports established technologies at 
the same time.” They interpreted both the technological system and the sectoral 
system of innovation concept, which includes an innovation element that creates, 
diffuses and uses new products (or technologies) and a production element, which is 
“responsible” for established products (or technologies). The latter is responsible for 
incremental innovation (and could be assimilated into a stable socio-technical 
regime); the former is responsible for radical innovation, which can lead to significant 
transformations. Fundamentally, this analysis considers a system that integrates a 
capacity to innovate, both incremental and radical. It is a meso-level approach that 
reaches well beyond niche level processes (Markard and Truffer 2008) and can help 
to analyse the regime in transition. 
In this perspective, a main input of technological systems of innovation is the 
notion of structural and functional analysis (Bergek et al. 2008; Hekkert et al. 2007), 
which helped identify several sub-functions assigned to innovation systems: the 
generation and diffusion of knowledge, the guidance of search process, the creation of 
markets, entrepreneurial experimentation, legitimization, etc. They can be seen as 
rules leading to radical innovation. Instead of leading to path dependency, these rules 
tend to create paths. 
Transition management has also pinpointed rules for the generation of 
radically new technologies. It is a model for managing transitions (Kemp et al. 2007) 
that includes the meso-level for a regime in transition. As a management model, it 
relies on rules and principles: long-term thinking as a framework for short-term 
action, thinking in terms of multiple domains, a focus on learning and learning about a 
variety of options and adaptive portfolios. This is not “intelligence” for planning, but 
an organized, stimulated Darwinist process of variation and selection. Once again, we 
find rules that do not lead to path dependency but, on the contrary, are formulated to 
overcome it. For instance, these rules counterbalance firms’ tendency to have 
restricted technological horizons and bounded visions (Rosenberg 1976), thus  
avoiding technologies with long development times. Whereas the rules identified in 
stabilized regimes tend to lock into a dominant design, these rules unlock by aiming 
to create new design paths.  
Let’s begin by analyzing the rules that unlock cognitively. With Nelson and 
Winter’s approach (Nelson and Winter 1977), a technological regime is defined as 
“the rule-set or grammar that is characteristic for the development of a technology and 
that guides not only the search activity of engineers, but also the actions and 
interactions of the other actors involved in technical development.” Nelson and 
Winter gave the example of DC3 aircraft in the 30s, which defined a particular 
technological regime: metal skin, low wing, piston powered planes. The rules stabilize 
a representation of the object, of the functional target and the way to reach it. They 
lock potential paths by determining a technological trajectory.  
By contrast, certain rules can create paths. For instance, the rules invented and 
taught at the Bauhaus design schools by famous teachers such as Klee, Itten and 
Kandinsky unlocked cognitive paths. Itten’s course was an archetypal example of 
unlocking rules in art (Itten 1975) (Klee 1966): the laws of form, colour and shape 
helped students to disentangle too self-evident relationships between material-shape-
colour-emotion and enabled them to explore beyond the clichés (“a warm fibrous 
wood”). We know the effects in term of generativity (famous objects, new grammars 
of forms, etc.). In engineering too, it has recently been shown that design theories and 
methods gain in generativity over time (Hatchuel et al. 2011). The generative power 
results from the rules set by the new design theories, which increase the capacity to 
rigorously use more diverse types of knowledge and to consciously break away from 
technological routines. These theories propose unlocking rules, to be embedded in the 
design reasoning. They can be as simple as: “in the case of an alternative between two 
solutions, design a third one.” They can be rules to inhibit the reuse of locking rules 
(eg rules to formulate design briefs such as “an aircraft without a piston engine”; 
“wood is not necessarily fibrous”; or “agriculture is not necessarily unsustainable”) or 
to encourage the opening of new ones (“an aircraft with fuel cells”).  
In the logic of socio-technical regimes, rules are extended to include socio-
technical aspects (Kemp et al. 1998). Geels suggested that two other forms of rules be 
analyzed: regulative rules, ie explicit formal rules, which constrain behaviour and 
regulate interaction (eg government regulation) and normative rules, which confer 
values, norms, expectations and responsibilities and are internalized through 
socialisation processes (Geels 2004) (p. 904). Are there normative and regulative 
unlocking rules?  
Normative unlocking rules can be seen in artistic milieus, where provocative, 
critical, inspiring comments are welcome and considered the relevant social 
behaviour. Here too, the example of Bauhaus provides interesting normative rules: 
students were encouraged to work together, to cross-evaluate their works and provide 
each other with constructive criticism (Droste 2002), ie to inspire, stimulate and 
educate each other, as a means of providing the mutual enrichment and development 
of the individuals involved. In innovation management, innovation teams and 
innovative firms have been described as using organic ways of acting together, which 
can be seen as normative unlocking rules (Burns and Stalker 1961; Le Masson et al. 
2010; O'Connor 2008) since people are required to rapidly change the targets of the 
projects, to demonstrate radical innovation and to involve other stakeholders in their 
projects. In transition management, rules such as “societal experiments as bottom-up 
experiments” call for interaction in a way that unlocks the process. Normative locking 
rules are caused by social groups and support their stability. There are also rules that 
are caused by groups and which are likely to change the group, the individuals and the 
objects they are used to dealing with. In this sense, they are normative unlocking 
rules.  
There are also regulative unlocking rules. Voluntary agreements (Aggeri 
1999) are an example of regulative rules at the European level, intended to give 
stakeholders the incentive to create new paths. Regulative rules can unlock, in the 
sense that they facilitate the emergence of alternatives (instead of configuring a 
regime towards a given path).  
Transition management and technological innovation systems suggest that in 
certain cases of regimes in transition, some rules at the regime level unlock rather 
than lock. Locking and unlocking rules can be compared as follows: i) unlocking rules 
tend to break dominant design rules, whereas locking rules tend to stabilize one path; 
ii) unlocking rules are open-ended (increase the variety of potential paths), whereas 
locking rules are deterministic (decrease uncertainty). Note that unlocking rules are 
not a weakened form of locking rules. Works on regimes and dominant design have 
underlined that (locking) rules can be strong or weak and that they can constrain (to 
follow a framework) as well as enable (inside this framework). Unlocking rules are 
not necessarily enabling, as they can also be either strongly or weakly unkocking. 
They can constrain and enable the breaking of the dominant design rules and the 
generation of new paths.  
 
The logic of actors and systems with unlocking rules 
We have clarified a type of rule that can exist in some regimes in transition. 
Are there forms of actors and forms of “systems” that are consistent with such 
centrifugal forces?  
Once again, transition management literature provides some insights. It 
analyzes the logic of “systems” and actors at the meso-level of a regime in transition 
and shows that it requires “special innovation platforms and support for selected 
paths” (Nill and Kemp 2009); the actors should be able to coordinate their actions in 
order to adjust the exploration to take into account the learning acquired in all the 
niches. It is a model of governance for shaping processes of co-evolution using 
visions, transitions, experiments and cycles of learning and adaptation. The actors do 
not compete with one another, as described in the evolutionary process, but are 
required to work closely together, although not all the aspects of the technologies are 
known. They collaborate in the unknown.  
Technical systems in transition at the regime level must be described 
differently. (Geels 2005) underlined the role of combination and aggregation between 
niches. (Nill and Kemp 2009) recommended that various transition paths should be 
explored, to avoid lock-in to a particular path. Analyzing the development of infant 
industries (Caniëls and Romijn 2008) underlined the role of complementary 
developments in providing inputs or consuming outputs of a technology. In such 
situations, the borders of the system cannot be limited to the past regime but have to 
include the emerging technologies experimented in niches.  
 
To conclude, the logic of unlocking rules helps identify an alternative to the 
evolutionary model of regimes in transition. In the latter, niches compete and follow 
an evolutionary path that enables some of them to become a new regime, which may 
replace the incumbent one. Unlocking rules suggest an interactive, generative model, 
in which the regime in transition takes part in the emergence of niches and evolves in 
close interaction with them, before finally being transformed into a new regime. A 
synthetic comparison is proposed below. 
 
 Model 1: evolutionary, 
substitutive 
Model 2: generative, interactive 
Interaction between 
niches and the 
regime 
The weakened regime is 
replaced by a winning 
niche 
The regime contributes to the 
emergence of niches and is 
transformed into a new regime 
through synergies and 
hybridizations  
Rules Locking: stabilizes one 
path, reduces uncertainty 
Unlocking: inhibits lock-in, 
generates multiple paths.  
Actors Individual entrepreneurs 
with their own strategy 
Collaboration in the unknown 
System A weakened system is 
replaced by one 
stemming from a niche 
Actors work on the incumbent 
system and on the alternatives 
in niches 
Table 1: two models of regimes in transition(s) 
Case study: the International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors 
The logic of unlocking rules and the associated model of regimes in transition 
can be illustrated with the case of an industry roadmap, the International Technology 
Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS). ITRS intervenes at the meso-level of the 
semiconductor development regime. All the industry’s major players (integrators, 
suppliers, universities, customers) use the ITRS to discuss and work together on the 
future technological generations (from +2 to +15 years). We used historical published 
and unpublished raw data from the ITRS and incorporated the key material gathered 
by (Schaller 2004). We added to this historical material thanks to our own deep 
involvement in the ITRS process. One of the authors of this paper has attended 11 
face-to-face meetings and over 25 conference calls of the ITRS International 
Roadmap Committee (IRC) since 2005 and has had access to working documents 
from several of the ITRS’ specialized working groups. He has conducted in-depth 
interviews with most IRC members, with experts in many of the ITRS working 
groups (2 to 5 people in five special interest groups – one on photolithography, three 
on device architecture, one on materials) and with researchers in research labs in the 
US (in particular Stanford Nanoelectronic Group and Stanford Nanofabrication 
Facility, 6 interviews) and in Europe (LETI in France, 8 interviews).  
 
We analyze the following three key aspects of the case: first, we check for 
case relevance by showing why ITRS is at the meso-level of a regime in transition(s); 
second, we describe the relationship between the incumbent regime and the niches; 
third, we focus on micro-processes inside this meso-level. In this way, we gradually 
bring to light the unlocking rules found in a regime in transition, and the actors and 
systems related to this kind of rule.  
 
Case relevance: ITRS and the meso-level of a regime in transition(s).  
We check that the semiconductor industry can be considered as a regime in 
transition. First, it shows a priori all the features of a regime: there are complex 
systems with many interdependencies, high sunk investments, complex actor 
networks, high sunk costs in R&D, specialized top-level expertise in very specific 
domains, etc.  
Second, we find the expected pattern of tensions and niches:  
• Tensions: for more than a decade and for each new generation, engineers and 
scientists consider that the next generation will have to overcome critical 
bottlenecks with breakthrough technologies. Customer needs are changing; 
new businesses and functions are emerging regularly (RF filters, camera 
sensors, gyroscopes for smartphones and gaming, electronics for touch 
screens, etc.).  
• There are also a large number of niches in the semiconductor industry: each 
actor (integrator, supplier, R&D lab, etc.) regularly creates original prototypes 
to be developed further. 
Third, there have been changes in the regime – not only once, but regularly 
over several decades. On the face of it, the regime is governed by Moore’s law 
whereby technologies are designed to be able to exponentially increase the number of 
components incorporated per integrated circuit by regular dimensional scaling. 
However, Moore’s law has actually been responsible for multiple regime changes. For 
instance, it caused the emergence of new technologies and breakthrough architectural 
solutions, as in the case of photolithography for the semiconductor industry 
(Henderson and Clark 1990) or the use of new materials (in the last decade, the 
semiconductor industry, which was initially limited to silicon, has explored almost all 
the elements in the periodic table). Moore’s law has also regularly changed the 
relationship between actors because, for each generation, there are always several 
ways of designing the whole system, so that the individual technology suppliers have 
always faced open-ended questions in terms of the performances they have to achieve 
in the system. 
Moore’s law can be seen as an unlocking rule as it obliges the actors to 
regularly open new technological paths. Contrary to the case of DC3, Moore’s law 
constantly sets new technological challenges (see below) as well as market challenges 
(eg by inventing new uses for computer power (Gawer and Henderson 2007)).  
In this context, ITRS has a clear objective, defined since 1994 as follows: 
“The Roadmap is analogous to paved roads of proven technology, unimproved roads 
of alternative technologies, footpaths towards new technologies, and innovative trails 
yet to be blazed.” (Semiconductor Industry Association 1994). Right from the start, it 
was therefore clearly the intention of ITRS’ proponents to tackle changes in the 
technological regime.  
Nonetheless, the ITRS is not a niche:  
• it has lived through several regime shifts (the ITRS effort was first initiated at 
the US national level in 1993);  
• it encompasses almost all the industry’s players in all geographic areas: its 
International Technology Working Groups (ITWG) address almost all aspects 
of semiconductors (design, process, instruments, etc.) and are composed of 
experts from industry (chip-makers (50% of the members) and their equipment 
and materials suppliers (25%), research institutes (20%) and government 
agencies (5%)). The overall coordination of the ITRS process is the 
responsibility of the International Roadmap Committee (IRC), which has two 
to four members from each sponsoring region (Europe, Japan, Korea, Taiwan 
and the United States).  
• ITRS’ audience is very large: the great majority of the research programs in 
the leading institutions we visited are explicitly related to ITRS roadblocks.  
• ITWGs do not carry out experiments: the members do experiments in their 
companies or labs, or report on experiments made elsewhere.  
Hence, the ITWGs are not niches but they report on and stimulate niche activities. 
ITWG members meet on a regular basis, most often organizing side-meetings while 
attending scientific conferences in their field. In addition, general ITRS meetings are 
held three times a year and are an opportunity for the IRC and all the ITWGs to get 
together to share information about the general direction of their work, solve pending 
issues and have cross-ITWG discussions, thereby ensuring overall coordination. The 
ITRS report is released annually. 
 
Hence, we can say that the semiconductor industry is a case of a regime in 
repeated transitions and that the ITRS is at the meso-level. We can already identify a 
logic of unlocking rules, eg the initial mission of the ITRS and Moore’s Law.  
Unlocking rules for managing niches at the meso-level 
How does the ITRS manage the interaction between the regime and the niches?  
Revealing and sharing the challenges 
The niches are first managed at the level of the Overall Roadmap Technology 
Characteristics (ORTC), a series of tables providing a consolidated summary of the 
key performance targets for various product lines (DRAM, Flash memory, 
microprocessor). They are not the result of existing technologies but a set of targets 
for designing future technologies capable of following Moore’s Law. 
By identifying the targets that have not been reached yet or that have proved to 
be out of reach with the existing technologies, ITRS helps reveal and share challenges 
at the industry level. It provides targets to be met by future niches.  
Monitoring and supporting niche expansion 
ITWGs translate these ORTC targets into more specific ones and identify potential 
solutions.  
We can illustrate this by studying how an ITWG managed the emergence of a 
radical technology. As the dimensions of transistors continue to shrink, new physical 
effects arise, such as “gate leakage” due to the onset of a tunnelling effect through the 
gate oxide layer. The need for new gate dielectrics was identified by the ITRS as early 
as 1994, calling for new technological developments. A first solution was mentioned 
in 1997 and led to a more precise description of the technological niche for this issue.  
Several niches were then monitored in the reports, with regular analysis of 
their likely performance and date of availability (a first breakthrough technology was 
launched in 2009). If we take a closer look at the monitoring process, we can see that 
target performance levels evolved considerably for two reasons:  
• As knowledge accumulated, it became possible to set more precise schedules 
and more relevant performance levels.  
• The quantitative evolutions were linked to the discovery of what was 
attainable in the technological path in question but also to the evolutions in 
other, complementary, technologies. For each challenge, the industry studied 
and developed other “knobs to turn”. These alternative technological concepts 
were themselves subject to progress, which explains how the rate of progress 
on the technologies could be tuned.  
We find the same pattern in other ITWGs, which follow similar unlocking rules: 
identification of a need for a technological breakthrough, clarification of the 
technological concepts to be further explored and monitoring of the niches with 
relative positioning of the technologies.  
Structuring a set of alternatives 
To understand how a set of technological alternatives can be managed, we analyze the 
evolution of one such set over time. Figure 2 represents the structure of the potential 
solutions explored for lithography and the technological alternatives given in ITRS 
updates from 2001 to 2009.  
 
 
Figure 1 –ITRS: potential solutions for lithography 2001-2009. Solution paths on the 
bottom left-hand side have a lot in common. Solution paths on the top right-hand side 
are largely unknown and have very few features in common.  
 
Since the engine of the semiconductor industry’s evolution has been its ability to 
fabricate ever-tinier devices, one of its most recurrent research challenges has been to 
find ways to etch ever-smaller features. This part of the integrated circuit fabrication 
process is known as “lithography”, and a whole research community is busy with its 
improvements. Within the ITRS, a specific ITWG is dedicated to its study. The finest 
resolution that can be reached by drawing with a laser is proportional to the 
wavelength of the illuminating light (Rayleigh principle). Since 1980, lithography 
equipment makers have therefore used lasers with decreasing wavelengths, ie 436nm, 
365nm, 248nm and 193nm. Accordingly, the ITRS 2001 edition envisaged that 
optical lithography could be extended by developing 157 nm technology. Beyond 157 
nm, solutions using extreme ultraviolet (EUV – 13nm wavelength) or electron-beam 
direct-write were to be developed. However, using a different illumination 
wavelength is a costly alternative. To prolong the lifetime of the 193nm platform, 
several alternatives were indicated, such as controlled over-etching, and the 
development of better resists, to improve image contrast. These alternative 
technologies concerned breakthrough paths, e.g. distinguishing between printed gate 
length (following Rayleigh) and the final “physical” gate, hence allowing to decrease 
the latter while keeping the same wavelength. 
Over time, the different niches built an interesting pattern. At a low level, new 
technology candidates were continuously introduced to reach the functional 
requirements within the existing platform. They shared many attributes with the 
existing platform. Many of these new technology candidates nonetheless broke away 
from some parts of the existing paradigms (eg “physical gate length = printed gate 
length” and “one print per feature” were respectively broken by over-etching and 
double patterning). 
In parallel, research continued on the next platform: 157nm (until 2005) and 
Extreme UV, which requires the creation of in-depth knowledge on refraction optics.  
On a third level, significant research efforts were also being made on another 
disruptive challenger, multiple e-beam lithography. Finally, “out-of-the-box” 
technologies were given visibility, by being included in the list of potential solutions, 
even though they were very abstract technological concepts (see “directed self-
assembly” or nano-imprints). 
  
ITWG niche management therefore appears to be based on unlocking rules. They do 
not offer alternative, emerging technologies, but monitor their emergence and 
differentiation. Using a biological metaphor, unlocking rules do not emerge in a 
selection process but in a speciation process: several distinct cells, presenting 
complementary features, can finally emerge from “stem” cells. 
Unlocking rules for collective work at the meso-level.  
Building potential solutions: handling divergent positions and negotiating in the 
unknown 
How do the actors work together to build a set of alternatives? What are the rules for 
collective work? We describe how new candidates for potential solutions were 
discussed in a specific field, device architecture. In late 2009 / early 2010, at the 
request of major memory manufacturers, two working groups held seminars to “reach 
approximate consensus on any “New Memory” technologies sufficiently mature to 
benefit from accelerated development” (internal working document). For each 
technology, proponents presented the pros and cons and the research needed, and 
circulated a white paper prior to the meeting. A “friendly critic” then presented a 
balanced assessment and finally, votes and discussions helped to identify critical 
research needs.  
A closer look at the process reveals that far from being a judging process, it 
was a knowledge-building and knowledge-sharing one. For instance, the voting 
criteria were not decided on before the process began, but after the review of the 
white papers, ie taking into account the knowledge on the topic acquired during the 
process itself. Likewise, over the course of the face-to-face meeting, the classification 
of the technologies under review was changed, from 4 to 5 families, with some 
technologies moving from one family to another.  
The ITWGs explained in a caveat that “the intent of this recommendation is to 
highlight technologies for additional roadmapping investment – but not at the expense 
of investment in or exploration of other candidates’ approaches. We are not picking 
winners and losers”. This was indeed the case, since all the technologies studied 
during the exercise were still present in the August draft versions of the 2011 ITRS 
edition.  
Conditions for sharing information: collaboration and competition 
Why do members take an active part in collaborative processes of this sort? 
Our data shows that disruptive technologies for semiconductors require 
transformations in large areas of the ecosystem. Alone, the disruptive innovator has 
very little chance of meeting all the conditions of compatibility in a complex, 
evolving system. We analyzed the schedules of ITRS meetings in detail. A working 
group typically spends between half and two thirds of the duration of the meeting in 
interaction with other working groups. The experts of one ITWG discuss, in detail, 
how the technological alternatives addressed by their own ITWG interact with those 
of the other ITWGs. The ITRS provides an arena to support the early propagation and 
integration of disruptive technologies: the innovators can benefit from early criticism; 
the providers of complementary technologies and the integrator can prepare for early 
integration; even the providers of incumbent technology can set relevant targets for 
their own technology developments.  
Why do members participate fairly? According to ITRS participants, the 
different ITRS processes, such as regular updates, cross-ITWG meetings, regular 
evaluations, etc., all make it difficult for one actor to appropriate the proceedings for 
its own purposes. A free-rider is always possible, but would be rapidly excluded. 
Conclusions 
A model of regime in transition, based on strong unlocking rules  
The ITRS illustrates a model of a regime in transition that does not follow the 
archetypal “evolutionary” pattern but is more based on a synergistic interplay between 
niches and the regime level. With regard to models of regimes in transition, we draw 
the following conclusions.  
First, transitions rely heavily on unlocking rules.  
• Regulative rules: the official goals of ITRS consist in opening new paths “yet 
to be blazed” and in identifying the limit of the technical norms stabilized in 
the past generation in order to put them into movement.  
• Normative rules: at ITRS, the “proper” behaviour does not consist in “hiding” 
disruptive questions. On the contrary, the organizational routines all aim at 
revealing the open issues and the expected breakthrough, with the 
identification of technical challenges, rigorous monitoring of alternative 
technologies and regular comparisons between alternatives, putting potential 
technologies to the test of all the facets of the systems. The ITRS system is 
based on co-stimulation, friendly criticism and support for technology 
development. “Don’t pick winners or losers” is the norm used to stimulate 
proposals, encourage participants, support the initiatives and to enrich and 
extend paths.  
• Cognitive unlocking rules are particularly striking at ITRS. The first is 
Moore’s law. As described above, Moore’s law does not lock-in but unlocks, 
in the sense that it stimulates radical technological innovation as well as 
disruptive market explorations. In dealing with niches, ITRS’ basic cognitive 
rules consist in identifying and generating alternative technologies to make 
sure that the future performances will be met. It systematically builds multiple 
alternatives to each existing technology, encompassing improvements to the 
technological platform, emergence and preparation of credible alternatives (the 
next platform) and the proposal of crazy ideas. The logic of ITRS consists in 
regularly increasing the variety of alternatives (instead of selecting).  
 
The logic of a system with unlocking rules: an ecology of concepts of socio-
technical systems 
Second, we confirm that in a situation with many unlocking rules, the actors work on 
the incumbent system as well as the alternative niches. The case study provides 
conceptual refinements on this extended “system”.  
ITRS actors use knowledge on the existing socio-technical system (its limits, 
design parameters, value, predictable improvements, etc.) but also work on several 
future alternative technologies addressed, or to be addressed, in niches. In these 
descriptions, emerging technologies are still partially unknown. In a regime in 
transition, the borders of the “system” have to be extended to the bundle of 
alternatives around this system.  
This bundle of technologies has a series of structures and interdependencies. 
Some alternatives have a lot in common. They are all part of the same platform or 
paradigm (the lithography paradigm using the 193nm laser). Others, on the contrary, 
break some rules at a very high level (e-beam, Gutenberg-style imprints, self-
assembly, etc. all break the design rule “with lithography”) or a lower level (“a 
lithography device based on Extreme UV (13nm) laser”). Over time, ITRS tends to 
maintain a structured set of technological alternatives, with three main types of 
expansions: improvements to the existing platform, creation and maturation of 
reasonable medium-term alternatives and crazy explorations. 
There is a critical dynamic underlying this structured set. The dynamics are 
not only defined by the competition and selection processes but also by variety 
generation, synergies and speciation:  
• Variety (re)generation: some niches help generate new ones, with a view to 
constantly maintaining the capacity to reach the required performance over 
time.  
• Symbiosis: in ITRS, niches combine into more sophisticated solutions, as 
learning in one niche supports expansion in another.  
• Speciation: niches evolve in accordance with evolution in other niches, not by 
competing with each other but in order to reach a mutually beneficial 
positioning to cover specific performance areas.  
Finally, unlocking rules generate and are based on what can be called an ecology of 
concepts of socio-technical systems. The notion of ecology of concepts helps to 
characterize the structure of the alternatives that the actors are able to imagine and 
work on at a certain point in time. It underlines that the alternatives in this ecology 
grow together, with synergies and interdependent speciation.  
The logic of actors working with unlocking rules: college of the unknown.  
Third, we confirm that in a situation with unlocking rules, actors work in close 
collaboration. In the evolutionary model of transitions, only a few, “deviant” actors 
work in niches on alternative technology; the semiconductor industry follows a model 
of collaboration in the unknown. We can refine our description of this collaboration.  
The collaborating actors are both “technology suppliers” and technology 
“users” (Intel, STMicroelectronics, Infineon, etc.), who are themselves strong 
designers. In this regime in transition(s), all the actors are able to set innovative 
targets, to investigate technology breakthroughs, to explore the new uses of emerging 
technologies, etc. 
These actors do not necessarily share competences (which would be critical 
for confidentiality and IPR reasons), they discuss the nature of the open questions, 
unsolved problems and critical challenges. In this “exchange in the unknown”, the 
“supplier” provides “ideas” and “stimuli” to support the design activities of the 
“receiver”. The unlocking rules described above correspond to the rules governing the 
interactions between designers at this meso-level: they do not select each other (“we 
don’t pick winners or losers”); beyond mutual prescription, the actors in ITRS interact 
as “design stimulators”. They inspire each other. This logic of inspiration between 
actors is well known in art (artists in artistic milieus inspire each other and the artists 
inspire the viewers). Whereas usual approaches in technology management tend to 
underline evaluation-selection logics or prescription logics, ITRS provides 
inspiration-based coordination between designing actors.  
ITRS gives visibility to a network of interactions that are mainly oriented 
towards enriching the ecology of concepts. We label this organization a college of the 
unknown, by analogy with the “invisible colleges” of Diana Crane (Crane 1972) who, 
studying research networks, noticed that a clique of researchers with direct and 
indirect links were influencing the works of the rest of the community. ITRS is also a 
college, where members know each other and have a great influence on the rest of the 
industry. However, this college is not oriented toward one scientific field but to the 
exploration of emerging technologies and the sustained renewal of the ecology of 
concepts.  
 
ITRS illustrates a model of regimes in transition. It does not follow the “evolutionary” 
pattern but a generative, interactive model. It is based on unlocking rules (instead of 
locking rules), which support collegial work in the unknown (instead of independent, 
competing entrepreneurs) and maintain an ecology of concepts of socio-technical 
systems (instead of an evolutionary pathway of niches) (see figure 3 below).  
 
 
Figure 2 – Regimes in transition with unlocking rules vs. locking rules 
 
More generally speaking, this model, inspired by transition management and 
technological innovation systems, calls for further research on alternatives to the 
evolutionary model. It represents a form of sustained breakthrough innovation, 
organized at meso-level and involving intensive design activities. It suggests a design 
regime, ie a regime whose logic is the constant “transition” or, better still, the constant 
renewal of products, competences and uses. Such a design regime can be 
characterized by the design capacities of the actors, by the design rules that link these 
actors and by the ecology of concepts structuring their efforts. When design capacities 
are limited, when design rules focus on conformation, when the ecology of concepts 
is fixed by the representation of the existing socio-technical system, then the design 
regime is stabilized into one socio-technical regime and plagued by waiting games. 
When design capacities increase and become more collective, inside colleges dealing 
with the unknown, when unlocking rules are introduced, when the ecology of 
concepts is living and constantly enriched, then more dynamic design regimes 
emerge. Today, the semiconductor industry is a good example of such a design 
regime. Doubtless other industries are also currently undergoing transformation, from 
a stabilized to a more dynamic design regime. The notions of unlocking rules, ecology 
of concepts and college of the unknown might help guide their transformation and 
provide new insights for public policies to support it.  
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